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Search Results (1561 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-46226 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-28 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: spi: fsl: fix controller deregistration Make sure to deregister the controller before releasing underlying resources like DMA during driver unbind. | ||||
| CVE-2026-34001 | 2 Redhat, X.org | 9 Enterprise Linux, Enterprise Linux Eus, Rhel Aus and 6 more | 2026-05-28 | 7.8 High |
| A flaw was found in the X.Org X server. This use-after-free vulnerability occurs in the XSYNC fence triggering logic, specifically within the miSyncTriggerFence() function. An attacker with access to the X11 server can exploit this without user interaction, leading to a server crash and potentially enabling memory corruption. This could result in a denial of service or further compromise of the system. | ||||
| CVE-2026-45855 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-28 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ata: libata-scsi: avoid Non-NCQ command starvation When a non-NCQ command is issued while NCQ commands are being executed, ata_scsi_qc_issue() indicates to the SCSI layer that the command issuing should be deferred by returning SCSI_MLQUEUE_XXX_BUSY. This command deferring is correct and as mandated by the ACS specifications since NCQ and non-NCQ commands cannot be mixed. However, in the case of a host adapter using multiple submission queues, when the target device is under a constant load of NCQ commands, there are no guarantees that requeueing the non-NCQ command will be executed later and it may be deferred again repeatedly as other submission queues can constantly issue NCQ commands from different CPUs ahead of the non-NCQ command. This can lead to very long delays for the execution of non-NCQ commands, and even complete starvation for these commands in the worst case scenario. Since the block layer and the SCSI layer do not distinguish between queueable (NCQ) and non queueable (non-NCQ) commands, libata-scsi SAT implementation must ensure forward progress for non-NCQ commands in the presence of NCQ command traffic. This is similar to what SAS HBAs with a hardware/firmware based SAT implementation do. Implement such forward progress guarantee by limiting requeueing of non-NCQ commands from ata_scsi_qc_issue(): when a non-NCQ command is received and NCQ commands are in-flight, do not force a requeue of the non-NCQ command by returning SCSI_MLQUEUE_XXX_BUSY and instead return 0 to indicate that the command was accepted but hold on to the qc using the new deferred_qc field of struct ata_port. This deferred qc will be issued using the work item deferred_qc_work running the function ata_scsi_deferred_qc_work() once all in-flight commands complete, which is checked with the port qc_defer() callback return value indicating that no further delay is necessary. This check is done using the helper function ata_scsi_schedule_deferred_qc() which is called from ata_scsi_qc_complete(). This thus excludes this mechanism from all internal non-NCQ commands issued by ATA EH. When a port deferred_qc is non NULL, that is, the port has a command waiting for the device queue to drain, the issuing of all incoming commands (both NCQ and non-NCQ) is deferred using the regular busy mechanism. This simplifies the code and also avoids potential denial of service problems if a user issues too many non-NCQ commands. Finally, whenever ata EH is scheduled, regardless of the reason, a deferred qc is always requeued so that it can be retried once EH completes. This is done by calling the function ata_scsi_requeue_deferred_qc() from ata_eh_set_pending(). This avoids the need for any special processing for the deferred qc in case of NCQ error, link or device reset, or device timeout. | ||||
| CVE-2026-45891 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-28 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: hns3: fix double free issue for tx spare buffer In hns3_set_ringparam(), a temporary copy (tmp_rings) of the ring structure is created for rollback. However, the tx_spare pointer in the original ring handle is incorrectly left pointing to the old backup memory. Later, if memory allocation fails in hns3_init_all_ring() during the setup, the error path attempts to free all newly allocated rings. Since tx_spare contains a stale (non-NULL) pointer from the backup, it is mistaken for a newly allocated buffer and is erroneously freed, leading to a double-free of the backup memory. The root cause is that the tx_spare field was not cleared after its value was saved in tmp_rings, leaving a dangling pointer. Fix this by setting tx_spare to NULL in the original ring structure when the creation of the new `tx_spare` fails. This ensures the error cleanup path only frees genuinely newly allocated buffers. | ||||
| CVE-2026-45893 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-28 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: apparmor: Fix & Optimize table creation from possibly unaligned memory Source blob may come from userspace and might be unaligned. Try to optize the copying process by avoiding unaligned memory accesses. - Added Fixes tag - Added "Fix &" to description as this doesn't just optimize but fixes a potential unaligned memory access [jj: remove duplicate word "convert" in comment trigger checkpatch warning] | ||||
| CVE-2026-45930 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-28 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: mctp: ensure our nlmsg responses are initialised Syed Faraz Abrar (@farazsth98) from Zellic, and Pumpkin (@u1f383) from DEVCORE Research Team working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative report that a RTM_GETNEIGH will return uninitalised data in the pad bytes of the ndmsg data. Ensure we're initialising the netlink data to zero, in the link, addr and neigh response messages. | ||||
| CVE-2026-45869 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-28 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: power: supply: wm97xx: Fix NULL pointer dereference in power_supply_changed() In `probe()`, `request_irq()` is called before allocating/registering a `power_supply` handle. If an interrupt is fired between the call to `request_irq()` and `power_supply_register()`, the `power_supply` handle will be used uninitialized in `power_supply_changed()` in `wm97xx_bat_update()` (triggered from the interrupt handler). This will lead to a `NULL` pointer dereference since Fix this racy `NULL` pointer dereference by making sure the IRQ is requested _after_ the registration of the `power_supply` handle. Since the IRQ is the last thing requests in the `probe()` now, remove the error path for freeing it. Instead add one for unregistering the `power_supply` handle when IRQ request fails. | ||||
| CVE-2026-45897 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-28 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nft_counter: serialize reset with spinlock Add a global static spinlock to serialize counter fetch+reset operations, preventing concurrent dump-and-reset from underrunning values. The lock is taken before fetching the total so that two parallel resets cannot both read the same counter values and then both subtract them. A global lock is used for simplicity since resets are infrequent. If this becomes a bottleneck, it can be replaced with a per-net lock later. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46130 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-28 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-verity-fec: fix reading parity bytes split across blocks (take 3) fec_decode_bufs() assumes that the parity bytes of the first RS codeword it decodes are never split across parity blocks. This assumption is false. Consider v->fec->block_size == 4096 && v->fec->roots == 17 && fio->nbufs == 1, for example. In that case, each call to fec_decode_bufs() consumes v->fec->roots * (fio->nbufs << DM_VERITY_FEC_BUF_RS_BITS) = 272 parity bytes. Considering that the parity data for each message block starts on a block boundary, the byte alignment in the parity data will iterate through 272*i mod 4096 until the 3 parity blocks have been consumed. On the 16th call (i=15), the alignment will be 4080 bytes into the first block. Only 16 bytes remain in that block, but 17 parity bytes will be needed. The code reads out-of-bounds from the parity block buffer. Fortunately this doesn't normally happen, since it can occur only for certain non-default values of fec_roots *and* when the maximum number of buffers couldn't be allocated due to low memory. For example with block_size=4096 only the following cases are affected: fec_roots=17: nbufs in [1, 3, 5, 15] fec_roots=19: nbufs in [1, 229] fec_roots=21: nbufs in [1, 3, 5, 13, 15, 39, 65, 195] fec_roots=23: nbufs in [1, 89] Regardless, fix it by refactoring how the parity blocks are read. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46167 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-28 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: usblp: fix uninitialized heap leak via LPGETSTATUS ioctl Just like in a previous problem in this driver, usblp_ctrl_msg() will collapse the usb_control_msg() return value to 0/-errno, discarding the actual number of bytes transferred. Ideally that short command should be detected and error out, but many printers are known to send "incorrect" responses back so we can't just do that. statusbuf is kmalloc(8) at probe time and never filled before the first LPGETSTATUS ioctl. usblp_read_status() requests 1 byte. If a malicious printer responds with zero bytes, *statusbuf is one byte of stale kmalloc heap, sign-extended into the local int status, which the LPGETSTATUS path then copy_to_user()s directly to the ioctl caller. Fix this all by just zapping out the memory buffer when allocated at probe time. If a later call does a short read, the data will be identical to what the device sent it the last time, so there is no "leak" of information happening. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46156 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-28 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: LoongArch: Fix potential ADE in loongson_gpu_fixup_dma_hang() The switch case in loongson_gpu_fixup_dma_hang() may not DC2 or DC3, and readl(crtc_reg) will access with random address, because the "device" is from "base+PCI_DEVICE_ID", "base" is from "pdev->devfn+1". This is wrong when my platform inserts a discrete GPU: lspci -tv -[0000:00]-+-00.0 Loongson Technology LLC Hyper Transport Bridge Controller ... +-06.0 Loongson Technology LLC LG100 GPU +-06.2 Loongson Technology LLC Device 7a37 ... Add a default switch case to fix the panic as below: Kernel ade access[#1]: CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.6.136-loong64-desktop-hwe+ #4 pc 90000000017e5534 ra 90000000017e54c0 tp 90000001002f8000 sp 90000001002fb6c0 a0 80000efe00003100 a1 0000000000003100 a2 0000000000000000 a3 0000000000000002 a4 90000001002fb6b4 a5 900000087cdb58fd a6 90000000027af000 a7 0000000000000001 t0 00000000000085b9 t1 000000000000ffff t2 0000000000000000 t3 0000000000000000 t4 fffffffffffffffd t5 00000000fffb6d9c t6 0000000000083b00 t7 00000000000070c0 t8 900000087cdb4d94 u0 900000087cdb58fd s9 90000001002fb826 s0 90000000031c12c8 s1 7fffffffffffff00 s2 90000000031c12d0 s3 0000000000002710 s4 0000000000000000 s5 0000000000000000 s6 9000000100053000 s7 7fffffffffffff00 s8 90000000030d4000 ra: 90000000017e54c0 loongson_gpu_fixup_dma_hang+0x40/0x210 ERA: 90000000017e5534 loongson_gpu_fixup_dma_hang+0xb4/0x210 CRMD: 000000b0 (PLV0 -IE -DA +PG DACF=CC DACM=CC -WE) PRMD: 00000004 (PPLV0 +PIE -PWE) EUEN: 00000000 (-FPE -SXE -ASXE -BTE) ECFG: 00071c1d (LIE=0,2-4,10-12 VS=7) ESTAT: 00480000 [ADEM] (IS= ECode=8 EsubCode=1) BADV: 7fffffffffffff00 PRID: 0014d000 (Loongson-64bit, Loongson-3A6000-HV) Modules linked in: Process swapper/0 (pid: 1, threadinfo=(____ptrval____), task=(____ptrval____)) Stack : 0000000000000006 90000001002fb778 90000001002fb704 0000000000000007 0000000016a65700 90000000017e5690 000000000000ffff ffffffffffffffff 900000000209f7c0 9000000100053000 900000000209f7a8 9000000000eebc08 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000006 90000001002fb778 90000001000530b8 90000000027af000 0000000000000000 9000000100054000 9000000100053000 9000000000ebb70c 9000000100004c00 9000000004000001 90000001002fb7e4 bae765461f31cb12 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000006 90000000027af000 0000000000000030 90000000027af000 900000087cd6f800 9000000100053000 0000000000000000 9000000000ebc560 7a2500147cdaf720 bae765461f31cb12 0000000000000001 0000000000000030 ... Call Trace: [<90000000017e5534>] loongson_gpu_fixup_dma_hang+0xb4/0x210 [<9000000000eebc08>] pci_fixup_device+0x108/0x280 [<9000000000ebb70c>] pci_setup_device+0x24c/0x690 [<9000000000ebc560>] pci_scan_single_device+0xe0/0x140 [<9000000000ebc684>] pci_scan_slot+0xc4/0x280 [<9000000000ebdd00>] pci_scan_child_bus_extend+0x60/0x3f0 [<9000000000f5bc94>] acpi_pci_root_create+0x2b4/0x420 [<90000000017e5e74>] pci_acpi_scan_root+0x2d4/0x440 [<9000000000f5b02c>] acpi_pci_root_add+0x21c/0x3a0 [<9000000000f4ee54>] acpi_bus_attach+0x1a4/0x3c0 [<90000000010e200c>] device_for_each_child+0x6c/0xe0 [<9000000000f4bbf4>] acpi_dev_for_each_child+0x44/0x70 [<9000000000f4ef40>] acpi_bus_attach+0x290/0x3c0 [<90000000010e200c>] device_for_each_child+0x6c/0xe0 [<9000000000f4bbf4>] acpi_dev_for_each_child+0x44/0x70 [<9000000000f4ef40>] acpi_bus_attach+0x290/0x3c0 [<9000000000f5211c>] acpi_bus_scan+0x6c/0x280 [<900000000189c028>] acpi_scan_init+0x194/0x310 [<900000000189bc6c>] acpi_init+0xcc/0x140 [<9000000000220cdc>] do_one_initcall+0x4c/0x310 [<90000000018618fc>] kernel_init_freeable+0x258/0x2d4 [<900000000184326c>] kernel_init+0x28/0x13c [<9000000000222008>] ret_from_kernel_thread+0xc/0xa4 | ||||
| CVE-2026-45975 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-28 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ublk: use READ_ONCE() to read struct ublksrv_ctrl_cmd struct ublksrv_ctrl_cmd is part of the io_uring_sqe, which may lie in userspace-mapped memory. It's racy to access its fields with normal loads, as userspace may write to them concurrently. Use READ_ONCE() to copy the ublksrv_ctrl_cmd from the io_uring_sqe to the stack. Use the local copy in place of the one in the io_uring_sqe. | ||||
| CVE-2026-45998 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-28 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rxrpc: Fix potential UAF after skb_unshare() failure If skb_unshare() fails to unshare a packet due to allocation failure in rxrpc_input_packet(), the skb pointer in the parent (rxrpc_io_thread()) will be NULL'd out. This will likely cause the call to trace_rxrpc_rx_done() to oops. Fix this by moving the unsharing down to where rxrpc_input_call_event() calls rxrpc_input_call_packet(). There are a number of places prior to that where we ignore DATA packets for a variety of reasons (such as the call already being complete) for which an unshare is then avoided. And with that, rxrpc_input_packet() doesn't need to take a pointer to the pointer to the packet, so change that to just a pointer. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46021 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-28 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: thermal: core: Fix thermal zone governor cleanup issues If thermal_zone_device_register_with_trips() fails after adding a thermal governor to the thermal zone being registered, the governor is not removed from it as appropriate which may lead to a memory leak. In turn, thermal_zone_device_unregister() calls thermal_set_governor() without acquiring the thermal zone lock beforehand which may race with a governor update via sysfs and may lead to a use-after-free in that case. Address these issues by adding two thermal_set_governor() calls, one to thermal_release() to remove the governor from the given thermal zone, and one to the thermal zone registration error path to cover failures preceding the thermal zone device registration. | ||||
| CVE-2026-45967 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-28 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Return proper address for non-zero offsets in insn array The map_direct_value_addr() function of the instruction array map incorrectly adds offset to the resulting address. This is a bug, because later the resolve_pseudo_ldimm64() function adds the offset. Fix it. Corresponding selftests are added in a consequent commit. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46063 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-28 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/shstk: Prevent deadlock during shstk sigreturn During sigreturn the shadow stack signal frame is popped. The kernel does this by reading the shadow stack using normal read accesses. When it can't assume the memory is shadow stack, it takes extra steps to makes sure it is reading actual shadow stack memory and not other normal readable memory. It does this by holding the mmap read lock while doing the access and checking the flags of the VMA. Unfortunately that is not safe. If the read of the shadow stack sigframe hits a page fault, the fault handler will try to recursively grab another mmap read lock. This normally works ok, but if a writer on another CPU is also waiting, the second read lock could fail and cause a deadlock. Fix this by not holding mmap lock during the read access to userspace. Instead use mmap_lock_speculate_...() to watch for changes between dropping mmap lock and the userspace access. Retry if anything grabbed an mmap write lock in between and could have changed the VMA. These mmap_lock_speculate_...() helpers use mm::mm_lock_seq, which is only available when PER_VMA_LOCK is configured. So make X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK depend on it. On x86, PER_VMA_LOCK is a default configuration for SMP kernels. So drop support for the other configs under the assumption that the !SMP shadow stack user base does not exist. Currently there is a check that skips the lookup work when the SSP can be assumed to be on a shadow stack. While reorganizing the function, remove the optimization to make the tricky code flows more common, such that issues like this cannot escape detection for so long. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46073 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-28 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hwmon: (powerz) Fix missing usb_kill_urb() on signal interrupt wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout() returns -ERESTARTSYS when interrupted. This needs to abort the URB and return an error. No data has been received from the device so any reads from the transfer buffer are invalid. The original code tests !ret, which only catches the timeout case (0). On signal delivery (-ERESTARTSYS), !ret is false so the function skips usb_kill_urb() and falls through to read from the unfilled transfer buffer. Fix by capturing the return value into a long (matching the function return type) and handling signal (negative) and timeout (zero) cases with separate checks that both call usb_kill_urb() before returning. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46004 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-28 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: caiaq: Handle probe errors properly The probe procedure of setup_card() in caiaq driver doesn't treat the error cases gracefully, e.g. the error from snd_card_register() calls snd_card_free() but continues. This would lead to a UAF for the further calls like snd_usb_caiaq_control_init(), as Berk suggested in another patch in the link below. However, the problem is not only that; in general, this function drops the all error handlings (as it's a void function) although its caller can propagate an error to snd_probe(), which eventually calls snd_card_free() as a proper error path. That said, we should treat each error case in setup_card(), and just return the error code promptly, which is then handled later as a fatal error in snd_probe(). This patch achieves it by changing the setup_card() to return an error code. Also, the superfluous snd_card_free() call is removed, too. Note that card->private_free can be set still safely at returning an error. All called functions in card_free() have checks of the unassigned resources or NULL checks. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46045 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-28 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: md/md-llbitmap: skip reading rdevs that are not in_sync When reading bitmap pages from member disks, the code iterates through all rdevs and attempts to read from the first available one. However, it only checks for raid_disk assignment and Faulty flag, missing the In_sync flag check. This can cause bitmap data to be read from spare disks that are still being rebuilt and don't have valid bitmap information yet. Reading stale or uninitialized bitmap data from such disks can lead to incorrect dirty bit tracking, potentially causing data corruption during recovery or normal operation. Add the In_sync flag check to ensure bitmap pages are only read from fully synchronized member disks that have valid bitmap data. | ||||
| CVE-2026-45837 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-28 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix use-after-free in arena_vm_close on fork arena_vm_open() only bumps vml->mmap_count but never registers the child VMA in arena->vma_list. The vml->vma always points at the parent VMA, so after parent munmap the pointer dangles. If the child then calls bpf_arena_free_pages(), zap_pages() reads the stale vml->vma triggering use-after-free. Fix this by preventing the arena VMA from being inherited across fork with VM_DONTCOPY, and preventing VMA splits via the may_split callback. Also reject mremap with a .mremap callback returning -EINVAL. A same-size mremap(MREMAP_FIXED) on the full arena VMA reaches copy_vma() through the following path: check_prep_vma() - returns 0 early: new_len == old_len skips VM_DONTEXPAND check prep_move_vma() - vm_start == old_addr and vm_end == old_addr + old_len so may_split is never called move_vma() copy_vma_and_data() copy_vma() vm_area_dup() - copies vm_private_data (vml pointer) vm_ops->open() - bumps vml->mmap_count vm_ops->mremap() - returns -EINVAL, rollback unmaps new VMA The refcount ensures the rollback's arena_vm_close does not free the vml shared with the original VMA. | ||||