| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| pam_usb provides hardware authentication for Linux using ordinary removable media. Prior to 0.9.0, the pusb_pad_compare() function in src/pad.c only verified that the user-side pad (~/.pamusb/device.pad) could be read, but did not enforce that the system-side pad (the pad file on the USB device) was also present and readable. If the user-side pad was deleted or unreadable, the function returned a failure that was treated as non-fatal in certain code paths, allowing authentication to succeed without the USB device being verified. A local user can delete their own ~/.pamusb/device.pad to remove the USB device requirement and authenticate without the physical device. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.0. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: rtnetlink: zero ifla_vf_broadcast to avoid stack infoleak in rtnl_fill_vfinfo
rtnl_fill_vfinfo() declares struct ifla_vf_broadcast on the stack
without initialisation:
struct ifla_vf_broadcast vf_broadcast;
The struct contains a single fixed 32-byte field:
/* include/uapi/linux/if_link.h */
struct ifla_vf_broadcast {
__u8 broadcast[32];
};
The function then copies dev->broadcast into it using dev->addr_len
as the length:
memcpy(vf_broadcast.broadcast, dev->broadcast, dev->addr_len);
On Ethernet devices (the overwhelming majority of SR-IOV NICs)
dev->addr_len is 6, so only the first 6 bytes of broadcast[] are
written. The remaining 26 bytes retain whatever was previously on
the kernel stack. The full struct is then handed to userspace via:
nla_put(skb, IFLA_VF_BROADCAST,
sizeof(vf_broadcast), &vf_broadcast)
leaking up to 26 bytes of uninitialised kernel stack per VF per
RTM_GETLINK request, repeatable.
The other vf_* structs in the same function are explicitly zeroed
for exactly this reason - see the memset() calls for ivi,
vf_vlan_info, node_guid and port_guid a few lines above.
vf_broadcast was simply missed when it was added.
Reachability: any unprivileged local process can open AF_NETLINK /
NETLINK_ROUTE without capabilities and send RTM_GETLINK with an
IFLA_EXT_MASK attribute carrying RTEXT_FILTER_VF. The kernel walks
each VF and emits IFLA_VF_BROADCAST, leaking 26 bytes of stack per
VF per request. Stack residue at this call site can include return
addresses and transient sensitive data; KASAN with stack
instrumentation, or KMSAN, will flag the nla_put() when reproduced.
Zero the on-stack struct before the partial memcpy, matching the
existing pattern used for the other vf_* structs in the same
function. |
| In xsltCopyText in transform.c in libxslt 1.1.33, a pointer variable isn't reset under certain circumstances. If the relevant memory area happened to be freed and reused in a certain way, a bounds check could fail and memory outside a buffer could be written to, or uninitialized data could be disclosed. |
| In numbers.c in libxslt 1.1.33, an xsl:number with certain format strings could lead to a uninitialized read in xsltNumberFormatInsertNumbers. This could allow an attacker to discern whether a byte on the stack contains the characters A, a, I, i, or 0, or any other character. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mctp i2c: initialise event handler read bytes
Set a 0xff value for i2c reads of an mctp-i2c device. Otherwise reads
will return "val" from the i2c bus driver. For i2c-aspeed and
i2c-npcm7xx that is a stack uninitialised u8.
Tested with "i2ctransfer -y 1 r10@0x34" where 0x34 is a mctp-i2c
instance, now it returns all 0xff. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pseries/papr-hvpipe: Prevent kernel stack memory leak to userspace
The hdr variable is allocated on the stack and only hdr.version and
hdr.flags are initialized explicitly. Because the struct papr_hvpipe_hdr
contains reserved padding bytes (reserved[3] and reserved2[40]), these
could leak the uninitialized bytes to userspace after copy_to_user().
This patch fixes that by initializing the whole struct to 0. |
| The deploy-stub component in Panda3D versions up to and including 1.10.16 contains a denial of service vulnerability due to unbounded stack allocation. The deploy-stub executable allocates argv_copy and argv_copy2 using alloca() based directly on the attacker-controlled argc value without validation. Supplying a large number of command-line arguments can exhaust stack space and propagate uninitialized stack memory into Python interpreter initialization, resulting in a reliable crash and undefined behavior. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm_user: fix info leak in build_mapping()
struct xfrm_usersa_id has a one-byte padding hole after the proto
field, which ends up never getting set to zero before copying out to
userspace. Fix that up by zeroing out the whole structure before
setting individual variables. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: xt_IDLETIMER: reject rev0 reuse of ALARM timer labels
IDLETIMER revision 0 rules reuse existing timers by label and always call
mod_timer() on timer->timer.
If the label was created first by revision 1 with XT_IDLETIMER_ALARM,
the object uses alarm timer semantics and timer->timer is never initialized.
Reusing that object from revision 0 causes mod_timer() on an uninitialized
timer_list, triggering debugobjects warnings and possible panic when
panic_on_warn=1.
Fix this by rejecting revision 0 rule insertion when an existing timer with
the same label is of ALARM type. |
| Use of uninitialized resource in Windows Imaging Component allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix oops due to uninitialised var in smb2_unlink()
If SMB2_open_init() or SMB2_close_init() fails (e.g. reconnect), the
iovs set @rqst will be left uninitialised, hence calling
SMB2_open_free(), SMB2_close_free() or smb2_set_related() on them will
oops.
Fix this by initialising @close_iov and @open_iov before setting them
in @rqst. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: Use u32 for non-negative values in ceph_monmap_decode()
This patch fixes unnecessary implicit conversions that change signedness
of blob_len and num_mon in ceph_monmap_decode().
Currently blob_len and num_mon are (signed) int variables. They are used
to hold values that are always non-negative and get assigned in
ceph_decode_32_safe(), which is meant to assign u32 values. Both
variables are subsequently used as unsigned values, and the value of
num_mon is further assigned to monmap->num_mon, which is of type u32.
Therefore, both variables should be of type u32. This is especially
relevant for num_mon. If the value read from the incoming message is
very large, it is interpreted as a negative value, and the check for
num_mon > CEPH_MAX_MON does not catch it. This leads to the attempt to
allocate a very large chunk of memory for monmap, which will most likely
fail. In this case, an unnecessary attempt to allocate memory is
performed, and -ENOMEM is returned instead of -EINVAL. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: add a bunch of missing ceph_path_info initializers
ceph_mdsc_build_path() must be called with a zero-initialized
ceph_path_info parameter, or else the following
ceph_mdsc_free_path_info() may crash.
Example crash (on Linux 6.18.12):
virt_to_cache: Object is not a Slab page!
WARNING: CPU: 184 PID: 2871736 at mm/slub.c:6732 kmem_cache_free+0x316/0x400
[...]
Call Trace:
[...]
ceph_open+0x13d/0x3e0
do_dentry_open+0x134/0x480
vfs_open+0x2a/0xe0
path_openat+0x9a3/0x1160
[...]
cache_from_obj: Wrong slab cache. names_cache but object is from ceph_inode_info
WARNING: CPU: 184 PID: 2871736 at mm/slub.c:6746 kmem_cache_free+0x2dd/0x400
[...]
kernel BUG at mm/slub.c:634!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
RIP: 0010:__slab_free+0x1a4/0x350
Some of the ceph_mdsc_build_path() callers had initializers, but
others had not, even though they were all added by commit 15f519e9f883
("ceph: fix race condition validating r_parent before applying state").
The ones without initializer are suspectible to random crashes. (I can
imagine it could even be possible to exploit this bug to elevate
privileges.)
Unfortunately, these Ceph functions are undocumented and its semantics
can only be derived from the code. I see that ceph_mdsc_build_path()
initializes the structure only on success, but not on error.
Calling ceph_mdsc_free_path_info() after a failed
ceph_mdsc_build_path() call does not even make sense, but that's what
all callers do, and for it to be safe, the structure must be
zero-initialized. The least intrusive approach to fix this is
therefore to add initializers everywhere. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
unshare: fix unshare_fs() handling
There's an unpleasant corner case in unshare(2), when we have a
CLONE_NEWNS in flags and current->fs hadn't been shared at all; in that
case copy_mnt_ns() gets passed current->fs instead of a private copy,
which causes interesting warts in proof of correctness]
> I guess if private means fs->users == 1, the condition could still be true.
Unfortunately, it's worse than just a convoluted proof of correctness.
Consider the case when we have CLONE_NEWCGROUP in addition to CLONE_NEWNS
(and current->fs->users == 1).
We pass current->fs to copy_mnt_ns(), all right. Suppose it succeeds and
flips current->fs->{pwd,root} to corresponding locations in the new namespace.
Now we proceed to copy_cgroup_ns(), which fails (e.g. with -ENOMEM).
We call put_mnt_ns() on the namespace created by copy_mnt_ns(), it's
destroyed and its mount tree is dissolved, but... current->fs->root and
current->fs->pwd are both left pointing to now detached mounts.
They are pinning those, so it's not a UAF, but it leaves the calling
process with unshare(2) failing with -ENOMEM _and_ leaving it with
pwd and root on detached isolated mounts. The last part is clearly a bug.
There is other fun related to that mess (races with pivot_root(), including
the one between pivot_root() and fork(), of all things), but this one
is easy to isolate and fix - treat CLONE_NEWNS as "allocate a new
fs_struct even if it hadn't been shared in the first place". Sure, we could
go for something like "if both CLONE_NEWNS *and* one of the things that might
end up failing after copy_mnt_ns() call in create_new_namespaces() are set,
force allocation of new fs_struct", but let's keep it simple - the cost
of copy_fs_struct() is trivial.
Another benefit is that copy_mnt_ns() with CLONE_NEWNS *always* gets
a freshly allocated fs_struct, yet to be attached to anything. That
seriously simplifies the analysis...
FWIW, that bug had been there since the introduction of unshare(2) ;-/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs: init flags_valid before calling vfs_fileattr_get
syzbot reported a uninit-value bug in [1].
Similar to the "*get" context where the kernel's internal file_kattr
structure is initialized before calling vfs_fileattr_get(), we should
use the same mechanism when using fa.
[1]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in fuse_fileattr_get+0xeb4/0x1450 fs/fuse/ioctl.c:517
fuse_fileattr_get+0xeb4/0x1450 fs/fuse/ioctl.c:517
vfs_fileattr_get fs/file_attr.c:94 [inline]
__do_sys_file_getattr fs/file_attr.c:416 [inline]
Local variable fa.i created at:
__do_sys_file_getattr fs/file_attr.c:380 [inline]
__se_sys_file_getattr+0x8c/0xbd0 fs/file_attr.c:372 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_conntrack_sip: fix use of uninitialized rtp_addr in process_sdp
process_sdp() declares union nf_inet_addr rtp_addr on the stack and
passes it to the nf_nat_sip sdp_session hook after walking the SDP
media descriptions. However rtp_addr is only initialized inside the
media loop when a recognized media type with a non-zero port is found.
If the SDP body contains no m= lines, only inactive media sections
(m=audio 0 ...) or only unrecognized media types, rtp_addr is never
assigned. Despite that, the function still calls hooks->sdp_session()
with &rtp_addr, causing nf_nat_sdp_session() to format the stale stack
value as an IP address and rewrite the SDP session owner and connection
lines with it.
With CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO (default on most distributions) this
results in the session-level o= and c= addresses being rewritten to
0.0.0.0 for inactive SDP sessions. Without stack auto-init the
rewritten address is whatever happened to be on the stack.
Fix this by pre-initializing rtp_addr from the session-level connection
address (caddr) when available, and tracking via a have_rtp_addr flag
whether any valid address was established. Skip the sdp_session hook
entirely when no valid address exists. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nfnetlink_log: fix uninitialized padding leak in NFULA_PAYLOAD
__build_packet_message() manually constructs the NFULA_PAYLOAD netlink
attribute using skb_put() and skb_copy_bits(), bypassing the standard
nla_reserve()/nla_put() helpers. While nla_total_size(data_len) bytes
are allocated (including NLA alignment padding), only data_len bytes
of actual packet data are copied. The trailing nla_padlen(data_len)
bytes (1-3 when data_len is not 4-byte aligned) are never initialized,
leaking stale heap contents to userspace via the NFLOG netlink socket.
Replace the manual attribute construction with nla_reserve(), which
handles the tailroom check, header setup, and padding zeroing via
__nla_reserve(). The subsequent skb_copy_bits() fills in the payload
data on top of the properly initialized attribute. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bonding: fix type confusion in bond_setup_by_slave()
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:2306!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
RIP: 0010:pskb_expand_head+0xa08/0xfe0 net/core/skbuff.c:2306
RSP: 0018:ffffc90004aff760 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88807e3c8780 RCX: ffffffff89593e0e
RDX: ffff88807b7c4900 RSI: ffffffff89594747 RDI: ffff88807b7c4900
RBP: 0000000000000820 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00000000961a63e0 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88807e3c8780
R13: 00000000961a6560 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: 00000000961a63e0
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fe1a0ed8df0 CR3: 000000002d816000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
ipgre_header+0xdd/0x540 net/ipv4/ip_gre.c:900
dev_hard_header include/linux/netdevice.h:3439 [inline]
packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3028 [inline]
packet_sendmsg+0x3ae5/0x53c0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3108
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:727 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:742 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0xa54/0xc30 net/socket.c:2592
___sys_sendmsg+0x190/0x1e0 net/socket.c:2646
__sys_sendmsg+0x170/0x220 net/socket.c:2678
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x106/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fe1a0e6c1a9
When a non-Ethernet device (e.g. GRE tunnel) is enslaved to a bond,
bond_setup_by_slave() directly copies the slave's header_ops to the
bond device:
bond_dev->header_ops = slave_dev->header_ops;
This causes a type confusion when dev_hard_header() is later called
on the bond device. Functions like ipgre_header(), ip6gre_header(),all use
netdev_priv(dev) to access their device-specific private data. When
called with the bond device, netdev_priv() returns the bond's private
data (struct bonding) instead of the expected type (e.g. struct
ip_tunnel), leading to garbage values being read and kernel crashes.
Fix this by introducing bond_header_ops with wrapper functions that
delegate to the active slave's header_ops using the slave's own
device. This ensures netdev_priv() in the slave's header functions
always receives the correct device.
The fix is placed in the bonding driver rather than individual device
drivers, as the root cause is bond blindly inheriting header_ops from
the slave without considering that these callbacks expect a specific
netdev_priv() layout.
The type confusion can be observed by adding a printk in
ipgre_header() and running the following commands:
ip link add dummy0 type dummy
ip addr add 10.0.0.1/24 dev dummy0
ip link set dummy0 up
ip link add gre1 type gre local 10.0.0.1
ip link add bond1 type bond mode active-backup
ip link set gre1 master bond1
ip link set gre1 up
ip link set bond1 up
ip addr add fe80::1/64 dev bond1 |
| libheif is a HEIF and AVIF file format decoder and encoder. In versions 1.21.2 and prior, when decoding a HEIF grid image with strict_decoding=false (the default), a corrupted tile silently fails to decode and the library returns heif_error_Ok with no indication of failure, leading to an uninitialized heap memory information leak. The canvas is allocated via create_clone_image_at_new_size() → plane.alloc() → new (std::nothrow) uint8_t[allocation_size] which does not zero the memory; only the alpha plane is explicitly initialized via fill_plane(), so the Y, Cb, and Cr planes contain whatever was previously at that heap address. The failed tile's region of the canvas is never written. It retains uninitialized heap data that is delivered to the caller as decoded pixel values (4,096 bytes per Y/Cb/Cr plane = 12,288+ bytes total). Any application using libheif to decode grid-based HEIF/AVIF files with default settings is vulnerable: a crafted .heic or .avif file causes 4,096+ bytes of heap memory to appear as pixel values in the decoded image, and the calling application receives heif_error_Ok, so it has no indication the output contains heap garbage. In server-side image processing, an uploaded crafted HEIF decoded and re-encoded (e.g., as PNG/JPEG for thumbnails, CDN, social media) can leak cross-user data such as auth tokens, database results, and other users' image data. This issue has been fixed in version 1.22.0. |
| Access of resource using incompatible type ('type confusion') in Microsoft Office Word allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally. |
